Expressed in the notation of quantification theory, these arguments become:
(I) (1) (y) [B(x,y)-Ny] (2) (y)(Ny-Ty)
(2) (Ey)B(x,y)
Bealer contends that "on the non-relationallnon-propositional theory of judgment there is no credible way even to express the above intuitively valid arguments ... ". 2 Thus, Bealer rejects Brentano's approach because, as he sees it, the theory "falters at the earliest possible stage: it collides with logic itself'. 3 I will show that Bealer is mistaken when he claims that Brentano's non-propositional theory cannot offer an adequate rendering of the first two arguments. While I grant that Brentano cannot provide an adequate translation of the third argument, I do not grant its intuitive validity.
To evaluate Bealer's challenges, we must first interpret the arguments in accordance with Brentano's theory.4 According to Brentano, every judgment is either an affirmation or a negation -an accepting a certain object or a rejecting or denying it. When one judges, one does not stand in relation to a proposition; rather one accepts or rejects some object. A belief that there are A's is an acceptance or rejection of A's -in this case an acceptance. "S judges that some A's are B's" is translated as "S accepts an A which is a B". Further, "S judges that some A is not B" becomes "S accepts an A which is not a B". So we 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid. 
